(A transcript from Armchair General Forum )
Section I: post #1 - post #300
Section II: post #301 – post #600
Section III : post #601 – post #900
Section IV : post #901 – post #1200
Section V : post #1201 – post #1459
- Thanks for this thread. You've got me reading my copy of "We Were Soldiers, Once, and Young." But I haven't read much on the bigger picture of this battle from the South Vietnamese perspective. I'm as guilty as anyone, but I think American students of this battle focus too much on just the role of American troops. (MontanaKid, #73)
- Amazon can thank you Phieu; Coleman's book is on the way, and when I find a copy of Why Plei Me?, I'll be snagging that too. So far, I've only found it listed at military and academic libraries around the country. I also found that it's cited in the first volume of the army's official history of combat operations. I've got out my copy of We Were Soldiers Once...And Young, and I'm going to go through all of the AARs and ORLLs with a fine-toothed comb. I'll be back eventually, and over-informed. But don't hold your breath. (Lucky 6 , #260)
- I've "fought" this campaign many times over the last few years using period maps and as much information as I could find (including the generalhieu.com site, why pleime, AARs, etc). Some things I've had to make assumptions on due to conflicting/poorly translated/wrong info, so I'm hopeful this discussion will continue. If anyone is interested in "playing" this let me know. By "playing" I mean following the flow of events from the US perspective rather than playing it as a game. Be aware that it's a work in progress, and will either require basic knowledge of things like map reading, symbology, mission planning etc, OR a willingness to learn it. (Samtn99, #269)
- Your knowledge and intellect are really no match for your cockiness, Phieu! (Altus, #277)
- When I thought Sorley's hagiography of Abrams would remain unsurpassed I was obviously plain wrong. (Boonierat, #439)
- Leave off the attack stuff and stick to the historic facts. I enjoy your historic points in this thread. (DeltaOne, #649)
- I've learned more about Vietnam in this thread than I have in probably two years of history in high school. Just saying this thread and its participants have an awful lot to offer, and I personally have learned a lot and wish to learn more. (Wellington95, #712)
- You lured me into these discussions, and I absorbed a lot of information. I have been able to listen to and question dissenting viewpoints. I have even changed my mind about things. You've done a decent job Anh Phieu, of making this interesting enough for me to dig into. Sometimes involving a lot of my time. But as the discussion lingers on, the more I see this is not a wise teacher promoting and prompting discussion by intelligent design...you are simply an immovable object that others want to prove wrong. Respect goes two ways. I respect you for being my elder. I respect the time and effort you put into making sense of the Pleiku Campaign. I respect you trying to preserve the history of your family, and the memory of your Brother. If you still have the inclination to "learn" something, I can help. If not. I'll still be here to argue. You're still in the upper half of my list of people I want to have a beer with. (Don, #744)
Armchair General Forum Ambiance
#487 20 Dec 11, 02:07
My Current Standing Status in ACG Forum
Let me make a report on my standing status in this forum as I understand it.
When I first joined in this forum, I was greeted with open arms.
I was humbled and eager to learn from military experts among the members as well as willing to offer my insights of the Ia Drang battle. I made it very clearly that at the outset that I would bring the expertise of my brother, General Nguyen Van Hieu, who was the main player in that battle.
On the way, I exposed my ignorance in some basic military knowledge, such as map reading, military symbols, types of report (AAR, ORLL), etc. I was offered some schooling in these areas and gladly accepted the opportunity to learn. A mutual friendly rapport had been established.
But then came in Altus, the VC I knew from TTVNOL, who started to challenge me at any opportunities. When I went into the counteroffensive and denounced him as a spy, I provoked an unexpected collective clamor of indignation from several ACG members who was unknowningly “americongs”. I was even admonished by the moderator for “nonsense” and “disturbance of peace”. In addition to that, I contrived several prominent members by exposing their flaws in their military fields of expertise. With the combination of these two elements, the tide took a sudden adversarial reverse turn against me.
The end result is that although I presented a most compelling exposé of the Pleime-Chupong-Iadrang campaign, during which time, nobody was able to come up with any objections and remained silent all along, until the moment I laid out the Art of How To Bridle a Mustang, Boonie launched the first salvo of an attack, not on inaccuracies of what I said – he could not name a single one, but a personal attack of a vague accusations of “hagiography, of promoting my brother and my book (what’s wrong with that even if that’s false or true). His followers in the assault could neither come up with any inaccuracies of what I said and also were contented with personal attacks.
The majority of ACG’s members - not the silent majority, but the vocal ones - had their mind totally locked up. They could not see the beauty of Colonel Hieu’s extraordinary operational concept that enabled him to herd the three NVA regiments into one location and to maintain them lingering at staging areas to become seating ducks, perfect targets for B-52 air strikes. They did not applaud when faced with such a military feat. Just because Colonel Hieu, an Arvin, had fared better than his American counterparts commanding generals, they booed him down. They are capable of praising a PAVN general, but not an ARVN general!
Strange indeed! It’s beyond comprehension. How can they justify their negative attitude? Are they that biaised?! Did they let their negative feelings obfuscate their mental ability of judgement and fairness attitude?
When I pointed out that my thread is well received and the fastest growing one based on the numbers of views, I was told no one – meaning ACG members – would read my postings anymore! The continuation of multiple counter clock tickings (10918) has – thanks to God – proved them wrong.
This strange situation makes me put in doubt the integrity of some “top” ACG members (actually I found out they are a group of self-serving guys who pat each other shoulders and could not stand being contradicted). And I can say I have not been treated fairly by them.
They almost succeeded in preventing me from bringing in my insight contribution on the Ia Drang battle to the ACG community.
#770 05 Feb 12, 01:23
What have I told you so far ...
... that you had not known before about Ia Drang battle …
1. The architect of Pleime Campaign was Colonel Hieu, II Corps Chief of Staff.
29. The different battles, operations, campaigns pertaining to the Pleime Campaign and their respective relationship: Pleime, Pleiku, Long Reach, All the Way, Bayonet I, Bayonet II, Dan Thang 21, Than Phong 7.
30. Red China’s direct involvement in the Plâyme campaign.
31. Even Joe Galloway, Hal Moore, Coleman, Kinnard, Schwarzkopf, who participated in different phases of the Pleime campaign, were unable to give us a complete and truthful account of what, how and why it happened as it was. They cannot claim that for being there and done that, as evidence they hold the truth of the matter.
32. The truth of the Pleime campaign is a hard to swallow pill for the Viet Cong on one side and the Allied (American, Australian, even French!) on the other side. It has been discarded as “hagiographic logorrhea” …
32. The fact that my presentation of the Pleime campaign with in particular Colonel Hieu as its architect was once done in the presence of General Vinh Loc and Brigadier General Mataxis, both participants in that campaign as the commander and American senior advisor, at the Vietnam Center in 2001, has reinforced its credibility: both did not raise any objections after listening to it.
33. Who is really to be blamed for the collapse of Saigon? The United States who cut off all aid in March 1975, not the ARVN who has always been accused of incompetence and cowardice.
34. The PAVN combatants were not that great. They only looked awesome with Big Brother Red China looming tall behind who directed the entire invasion war executed by the PAVN troops from the outset in the 1960s to the very end in 1975.
#1065 21 Aug 12, 09:23
During the recent Q&A session, the following hot points have been raised: