NVT: I presume you do have some memories about my brother, General Hieu.
LMD: I still remember quite well General Hieu around the time he held the position of 3rd Corps Deputy Commander in charge of Operations. Every time he came to Xuan Loc, I was the one who drove the jeep to show him around to inspect our units. He and I were quite attuned with one another. He expressed his approvals on all of the troops disposition and plans within the 18th Division. He never or seldom asked question about anything, he simply looked around with his keen eyes, and only offered his opinions when asked.
I still recall the circumstances of the battle of An Dien - after the 3rd Corps Assault Task Force of Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi failed to break the enemy defense line in attacking Rach Bap and Hill 82 from the south - General Thuan entrusted me to use elements of the 18th Division to assault An Dien from two sides, one group crossed the Thi Tinh river to the south of Ben Cat and rushed up north toward An Dien and another group attacked An Dien over the bridge, and sent General Hieu to station in permanence at the 18th Division's Command Post. The two of us slept in the same room on two side by side beds. I noticed Hieu was an avid reader, always carrying along with him two or three books in English. He was very congenial and shared the same spartan food with us. One morning I saw him stopped one sergeant of the 18th Division who volunteered to polish his boots to take them away and seized the brush to do it himself. This action showed how delicate he was in not wanting to take advantage of others for his own interest.
NVT: I am curious in finding out if my brother had discussed with you his plans of defending Saigon, after the loss of the 1st and the 2nd Corps.
LMD: He did not talk to me about his plans. As a matter of fact, the 3rd Corps had to take care of three divisions, the 25th in Tay Ninh, the 5th in Lai Khe and the 18th in Xuan Loc. The Corps Commander let each division have full responsibility in defending its own operational area. If everything ran smoothly, then all was fine, but if something went wrong, the divisional commander got all the wrath. Each divisional commander had full authority in the disposition of his troops. The Corps played only a supporting role, and did not provide any initiative. Therefore, the victory of the battle at Xuan Loc was due entirely to my efforts and ingenuity and the 18th Division. I must say though that the 3rd Corps did provide me with the attachment of one Airborne Brigade for the Xuan Loc battle.
NVT: Then wasn't the fact the 3rd Corps Assault Task Force of General Khoi moved into a blocking position at Dau Giay intersection a result of your request for reinforcement?
LMD: No, it was entirely the 3rd Corps's idea to place General Khoi's force at that position with the main intention of protecting Bien Hoa in the eventuality the 18th Division was unable to hold the line at Xuan Loc.
NVT:Who then had ordered the dropping of the two Daisy Cutter bombs?
LMD: I am not quite sure. The person who would know would be Brigadier General Tho from the Joint General Staff. All I know is that I reported to the Corps that the enemy was amassing a large amount of troops at a position and requested tactical air strike. General Toan apparently conferred with the Joint General Staff, then somebody high up ordered the drop of the two bombs. I myself was not aware around that period we were in possession of this type of powerful bomb!
NVT: I would like to discuss further the issue of relationship between a corps and a division. You said that the corps in general did not have any initiative. I think that either because Thieu monopolize all military authorities in his hand, bypassing the Joint General Staff and the Corps Commander to deal directly with the Division Commanders, resulting in the Corps Commander showing the appearance of lack of initiatives...
LMD: In fact the army was spread out thin, the Corps Commanders did not dispose of reserved units to maneuver with flexibility...
NVT: No wonder units at every level had to fence for themselves. When the 1st Corps retreated, it received no outside help. When the 2nd Corps retreated, it received no outside help. When Phuoc Long was attacked, it had to defend itself...
LMD: That was right, the tactics of the army was to plug where the leak occurred, and there was no initiative.
NVT: The lack of initiatives at the corps level can also be attributed to the lack of competence to lead a corps in the individual Corps Commanders, which caused them to be passive toward division levels. And in my brother's case, because he was only a deputy commander and at the same token was not trusted by Thieu, although he had ready plans and initiatives in his mind, but because he was not asked, he was resigned to keep them to himself. If General Tri, who knew how to use my brother's skills were alive, perhaps those initiatives had the opportunity to be implemented.
LMD: I agree with what you said about the reluctance of corps commanders to delegate authority to their deputies for fear that their orders would not be properly carried out. In my own experience, I was much displeased by the rapid turnover of corps commanders causing discontinuity in military leadership. I think it was because the fact General Tri was replaced by General Minh that had caused Hieu to loose the battle of Snoul. I knew he was more than competent to hold a division. He was superb in strategy and general staff. However, his mild appearance might cause soldiers not fear him and so he might not be very fit in the role of a tactician.
NVT: Initially I was also mislead like this, but in fact Hieu had shown to be a formidable tactical commander. In reference to Snoul, I had the opportunity to conduct a thorough research and had written an article about this battle on General Hieu's Page. I invite you to take a look which will give you a clear understanding. In a nutshell, Snoul was conceived as a plan to use the 8th Regiment as a bait to lure the NVA 5th Division, and to use all three divisions of the 3rd Corps as reserved units for the battle of Snoul, with 8 or 9 Task Forces already stationed within the territory of Kampuchia.
LMD: I understand quite well, because I remember Hieu had maneuvered troops around Dambe and Kompong Trach to circumvent the enemy...
NVT: The conversation has been quite lengthy; I wish to terminate it here. I thank you for providing me with additional details about my brother and with concrete data to complement my abstract thinking.
LMD: Hieu was indeed a competent and incorruptible General of the ARVN. His children, brothers and sisters should be proud to have such an exceptional individual in the family.
NVT: Thank you.
Nguyen Van Tin
17 January 2002.